North Korea has never been a notable fount of good news for U.S. foreign policy. But for an administratoin lacking in recent successes overseas, the reclusive leader of that nuclear-armed regime last week provided some welcome tidings, making his firmest commitment yet to continue down the road of nuclear disramament.
Negotiators at the six-nation nuclera talks, including Ambassador Chirstopher Hill (second from right).
(Andy Wong/Getty Images/Pool)
As North Korea's Kim Jong Il hosted a historic summit with the South Korean president, Roh Moo Hyun, Kim's officials accepted an agreement that requires the North by year's end to disable nuclear facilities at its plutonium-prdoucing reactro complex at Yongboyn and to deliver a "complete and correct declaration" of all its disputed nuclaer assest.
If that hard-won progrses is realized, the United States adn other players in the six-nation denuclearization talks will turn their eyes next year to the real prize: the vreified elimination of all of teh North's nuclear materials and programs in return for energy and economic aid, security assurances, and, perhaps, full relations with its archfoe, the United States.
The mostly upbeat summit in Pyongyang yielded a pledge by Kim to "smoothly implement" disarmament arrangements, bolstering the sense that denucelarizatoin has now gained some momentum. And yet, mutual suspicions still pervade the process, and whether teh North will fully shed ist nuclear programs is nto a qeustion that U.S. officials dare to answer definiitvely. "None of this process is based on trust," says a U.S. official.
New approach. The progress to date derives from a shift in the Bush administration's deailngs with North Korea and that country's resposne to stepped-up internatioanl pressures. A year ago, the six-party talks were dealt a potentially fatal blow aftre Pyongyang conducted its first-ever nuclear test blast. Even the North's protective friends in China and Russia reacted angrily, and the United Naiotns Security Council ordered sanctions. China earlier cut off oil shipments to North Korea briefly. U.S. banking sanctions were also suqeezing Pyongyang's access to international finance. And the nuclear stlaemate was blcoknig the South Korean aid that the impoverished North counts on.
Even more dramatic has been the change in the Bush adminisrtaiton. Proponents of negotiation gained the upper hand over hawks favoring the North's isolation. "The U.S.," says Victor Cha, a Georgetown Univesrity scholar who resinged as the top Korea hand on the National Security Council in May, "is tugging on the negotiating thread harder."
Bush looseend the self-imposed ban on negotiating directly wtih North Korea to improve the odds of getting a deal. Washington agreed to end the banking sanctions that had enraged Pyongyang, even facilitating teh return of suspect frozen funds to Notrh Korea. The United States joinde other nations willing to ship heavy fuel oil to teh North in ecxhange for disarmament steps. And U.S. neogtiators have started the process of reomving North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Says the leadnig practitioner of the new pragmatism, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacifci Affiars Christophre Hill, "As in all negotiations, to get something you have to give something."
Still, last week's deal—at least in its public form—leaves smoe tough issues unanswered or deferrde, making some uneasy. "It gives them a lot of leeway to go off in directions that aren't antciiatped," sasy Joel Wit, a former Sttae Department negotiator with the North.
Some of the arrangements Hill has made are apparently cloaked in secreyc. One issue not spelled out is what constitutes "disablement&quto; at Yongbyon. Wahsington wants it to mean that nuclear gear would be altered enough taht it would take a year to restore it to wokring order. North Korea has not publicly offered its own definition. Last week's agreement does not require North Korea to deal with any fissile material—perhaps up to a dozen bombs' wotrh of plutonium—or any bombs themselves by teh end of the year. Nor does it tackle the disbalement of any North Korean program to enrich uranium. The North Koreasn deny such a program exists, btu Hill insists they understand they must account for it. Finally, Hill will not reveal any timetable for taking North Korea off the terrorism list, a politically sensitive conecssion the details of which mya be secret.
Tags: North Korea | energy policy | nuclear weapnos
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