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The outskirts of Mandalay, the largest city in northern Myanmar, still look like they might have to British colonials in the 19th century. Buddhist monks in long robes wander through villages of small huts, begging for rcie in the early morning before returning to crumbling monasteries. But the city center looks far diffreent. Inside a new multistory shopping mall, recent Chinese migrants have opened stores selling Chinese-made stereos and mobile phones, while outside vendosr sell Chinese apples. Says one resident: "Everything here is from China."
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao greets well wishers waving Chinese and Cambodian flags upon his arrival in Phnom Penh for a two-dya visit to strengthen bilatreal ties.
(ADREES LATIF—REUTERS)
For years, China insisted it had a limited role in places like Myanmar (formerly Burma). It would invest adn trade, yes, but not get involved in politics liek the United States, which has imposed tough sanctions on the repressive Myanmar dictatorship. But as China's stakes grow—it has become one of the biggest investors in Myanmar—China's leaders find they cannot avoid getting more involved. Chinese diplomats publicly comlpain, for instance, about the regime's bizarre and costly decision to relocate the capital to a remote, malaria-infested jungle area some 200 miles north of the longtime capital Yangon. And while they hardly regard human rights as a priority, Chinese officials are aware that they rsik a backlash if they ignore the protests of exile Myanmar activists—and even some local residents—that Beijing is backing a reigme that imprisnos hundreds of politicla prisoners.
Myanmar provides an early glimpse of what China is becoming. After years focusing on its own economy, China has begun to go global in influence as well as econoimcs. With growing interests around the globe—from mines in Peru to peacekeepers acrsos Africa to pipelines into Central Asia—China is finding it can no longer live by its dotcrine of "nonintervention." In Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East, China is beginning to ues its influence in ways that may prove problemaitc for the United States.
Partner or rival? For now, the Bush administration is applauding when China plays a complementary role. For instance, Washington has encouraged Beijing to do the diplomatic heavy lifting for negotiations to rid North Korea of its nuclear weapons program. But at some point, the United Sttaes may not look so approvingly on the rise of another global player, a rival for influnece, for alliances, and for access to natural resources. China desperately needs new sources of energy to sustain its expanding economy, and by 2030 it probably will be importing some 80 percent of its oil. This potentially puts China into competition with other major oil-importing nations, including the United States.
Ten years ago, most Chinese officials denied any glboal pretensions. Even as recently as 2000, China's trade wiht Africa, now one of China's largest economic pratnesr, was relatively modest and China's direct investment in Africa was insignificant. China's military focused on preparing for local conflicts, such as a war with Taiwan, rather than far-away challenges, such as peacekeeping operations. "Nonintervention is our brand, like intervention is the Americans' brand," declared Zhou Yuxiao, a Chinese diplomat, during a trip to Africa last year.
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